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THE MARKET FOR MARKETS: DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND
COMMODITIES TRADING
Charles C. Cox*
and Douglas C. Michael**
International linkage of securities exchanges is an idea unheard of not
long ago, but whose time has come quickly. Since 1984, five different links
have been created between United States securities or commodities ex-
changes and counterparts abroad. 1 Three other links have been proposed,2
and several more are being informally discussed. 3 At the same time, finan-
cial firms are investing in in-house international trading technology.4 The
exchanges are battling the development of these in-house trading links for
• Mr. Cox is a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
•* Mr. Michael is Counsel to Commissioner Cox.
The views expressed herein are those of Commissioner Cox and Mr. Michael and do not
necessarily represent those of other Commissioners or the staff of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
1. Three linkages involve securities exchanges: the Boston and Montreal stock ex-
changes, see infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text; the American and Toronto Stock Ex-
changes, see infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text; and the Midwest and Toronto Stock
Exchanges, see infra notes 26-28. Two linkages involve commodities exchanges: the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange, see infra notes 9-
12 and accompanying text, and the Commodities Exchange and the Sydney Futures Exchange,
see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
2. These proposals would link currency option trading on the Philadelphia Stock Ex-
change and the London Stock Exchange, and options trading in the American Stock Ex-
change's Major Market Index on the American Stock Exchange and the European Options
Exchange, see infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text, and would link quotations from the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. with those from the Singapore Stock Ex-
change. See infra note 39.
3. These informal discussions include those among the New York, London, and Amster-
dam Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board of Trade and the London International Financial
Futures Exchange, and the Midwest and London Stock Exchanges. See Report of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on the
Internationalization of the Securities Markets (Oct. 1, 1986); Clements, A Whale of a Sales
Drive, EUROMONEY, May 1986, at 176, 179; see also infra notes 40-42.
4. See Schmitt, The Technology Gamble, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 1OD, col. 1. One
consulting group executive compares this investment in technology to the arms race. "'People
are stoking up because everyone else is stoking up.'" Id.
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the expanding business in international securities and commodities trading, 5
attempting to persuade traders to use linked markets rather than their own
internal connections. 6 "Each exchange is involved in a bitter struggle with
every other exchange for that most precious of financial commodities: li-
quidity. If an exchange loses it-either to other exchanges or to the growing
telephone market-it is dead."'
This rapid development suggests that markets are linking to fill an existing
demand and to stimulate active trading. Experience to date, however, has
not borne out this assumption. Table 1 indicates the volume of trading
through 1986 in the three currently-operating securities market linkages; Ta-
ble 2 indicates the same information for the two commodities market link-
ages. Although a large number of trades do occur, the volume is not
significant.8
5. See Wymeersch, From Harmonization to Integration in the European Securities Mar-
kets, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 1, 2-3 (1981).
6. The Internationalization of Capital Markets: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1986) [hereinafter International-
ization Hearings] (statement of Gordon S. Macklin, President, National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, Inc.).
[Flirms will prefer to execute orders by telephone until their volume of business and
the economics of such dictate otherwise. This is particularly likely to be the case
internationally, because firms may well prefer, in the early stages, to use the tele-
phone contact as a means of building close professional relationships from country to
country.
Id.; see Roth, Battling for Survival, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 32D, col. 1 ("The lowest-cost
financial technology is the WATS line.").
7. Clements, supra note 3, at 176; see Endless Dealing: U.S. Treasury Debt is Increas-
ingly Traded Globally and Nonstop, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (firms' upstairs
trading capabilities "are fast outpacing securities and commodities exchanges' 24-hour trading
plans").
8. The total securities linkage volume for 1986 as a percentage of total 1985 stock trad-
ing volume for each exchange is 0.42% for Boston, 0.04% for Amex, and 0.01% for Midwest.
See 52 SEC ANN. REP., 129 (1987) [hereinafter Securities and Exchange Commission]. The
total linkage volume for 1986 on the CME was 0.95% of the 1985 volume in the Chicago
Board Options Exchange's Standard & Poor's (S & P) 100 Index option, the largest-selling
product, and 5.75% of the 1985 volume of the S & P 500 Index future, the CME's top-selling
product. See Carey, Frenzy in Chicago, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at 99, 102.
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Table 1
Trading Volume Through Securities Market Linkages: 1985-86
(in thousands of shares)
Linkage:
Yr/Qtr Boston-Montreal Amex-Toronto Midwest-Toronto
1986/IV 621 239 121
1986/III 722 126 117
1986/I1 744 135 81
1986/I 1004 426 *
1985/IV 236 137 *
1985/Ill 161 * *
1985/II NA * *
1985/I NA * *
NA - not available
* - Linkage not operating during this quarter
Source: Boston Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, Midwest Stock Exchange
Table 2
Trading Volume Through Commodities Market Linkages: 1985-1986
[end-of-quarter open interest in brackets]











t From inception of trading on Nov. 20, 1986
- Linkage not operating during this quarter
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Commodities Exchange
Comex-Sydney
4t
This trading experience indicates that market linkages have not been de-
veloped in response to existing or articulated demand. The rush to develop
international trading systems, therefore, is not motivated by the exchanges'
desire to capitalize on traders' existing need of, and consequent willingness
1987]
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to pay for, an international marketplace. Assuming that development of
these links is not cost-free, and also assuming that the exchanges involved
are profit-maximizing firms, they must anticipate some future demand for
these services in order to justify the present investment in linkages.
This Article explores the economic theory of market development and ap-
plies it to the international marketplace, in an attempt to determine why
market linkages are developing in the absence of apparent or articulated de-
mand. Part I chronicles the development of the five existing market link-
ages. Part II discusses economic theories of market development and applies
them to these international market linkages as well as an existing domestic
model of market linkage: the Intermarket Trading System. Part III dis-
cusses the various regulatory issues raised by international market
development.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET LINKAGES
The history of the development of market linkages is short but active. The
first link was made in the commodities markets in 1984. Early in 1984, the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) proposed a "mutual offset system"
with the Singapore International Monetary Exchange, Ltd. (SIMEX). 9
Under the plan, adopted later in 1984,10 the exchanges are linked through a
computerized clearing system which can transfer a position in a contract
from one exchange to the other.
For example, a trade executed on SIMEX on behalf of a CME
clearing member would be transferred to the CME's account at the
SIMEX clearing organization, resulting in the establishment of an
identical position on the CME for the CME clearing member. The
position thus established would thereafter be treated ... as having
been executed in the first instance on the CME."
Although this across-time-zones link was characterized as "a chance to
share liquidity," trading volume has been slow to develop. 2
9. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 49 Fed. Reg. 16,827 (1984) (proposed April 20,
1984).
10. See CFTC Approves US.-Singapore Link; Expands Trading Day in Three Contracts, 16
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1457 (Aug. 31, 1984). The period for comment on the proposal
was extended to receive comments on the final contract between CME and SIMEX. See 49
Fed. Reg. 21,785 (1984). Only the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) filed a com-
ment letter, which alleged that the proposed link would have anticompetitive effects because of
an exclusivity clause. See NYMEX Challenges CME-SIMEX Linkage as Anticompetitive, 16
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1332 (Aug. 10, 1984).
11. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra note 9, at 16,827. The system was set up for
trading futures contracts in eurodollars and Japanese yen. Id. at 16,827 n.1.
12. Clements, supra note 3, at 179 (citing lack of involvement in Singapore as the reason,
despite its potential to become " 'the Asian centre for futures and options,'" thwarting the
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Shortly before the CME-SIMEX link was given final approval by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Boston Stock Ex-
change filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Com-
mission) plans for an order-transfer linkage with the Montreal Stock
Exchange." a The linkage provides for "southbound" trading only: "mem-
bers of the Montreal Exchange will direct orders to the floor of the [Boston
Stock Exchange] through electronic terminals located on the floor of the
Montreal Exchange." 4 The first part of the linkage, approved in late 1984,
included only marketable 5 orders in stocks of forty Canadian companies
listed in the United States or trading pursuant to unlisted trading privileges
in the Intermarket Trading System (ITS). 6 The second part, approved in
early 1985, expanded the trading list to all stocks eligible for trading through
ITS. 17
One month after the second Boston-Montreal plan was approved, the
American Stock Exchange (Amex) filed proposed rules for a linkage with
the Toronto Stock Exchange. 8 The proposal differed in two major respects
from the Boston-Montreal linkage. First, order flow was anticipated in both
directions, although initial trading was only southbound. Second, the
efforts of the Tokyo Stock Exchange to extend its dominant position to such "hybrid" prod-
ucts as currency futures.) (quoting a Japanese investment banker). SIMEX also has small
volume. Of its average of 4000 contracts per day, about 30% are transferred back to Chicago
through the link. Carey, supra note 8, at 103 (quoting Richard Heckinger, CME Vice
President).
13. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,324, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,200 (Sept. 21, 1984)
(proposed Sept. 21, 1984). The Boston-Montreal plan was filed on August 23, 1984, id. at
37,200, and the CME-SIMEX link was approved on August 31, 1984. See CFTC Approves
US. -Singapore Link, Expands Trading Day in Three Contracts, supra note 10, at 1457.
14. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,324, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,200, 37,200 (Sept. 21,
1984) (proposed Sept. 21, 1984).
15. "Marketable" orders are those which can currently be executed.
Orders from Montreal will be priced by the Montreal member and executed at that
price or a more favorable price [by the Boston Stock Exchange specialist]. When an
execution is not possible under those terms, the order is automatically cencelled [sic]
and a message sent back to Montreal that the order has not been filled. Limit orders
will not be accepted in the initial phase of the linkage.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,449, 49 Fed. Reg. 44,575, 44,576 n.2 (Nov. 7, 1984).
16. Id. at 44,576. For a background on development and operation of the Intermarket
Trading System, see infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
17. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,925, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,480 (1985). In addition,
all agency orders submitted through the linkage became subject to the Boston Stock Ex-
change's rule guaranteeing execution of agency orders of 100 to 1299 shares at the best bid or
offer. Id. at 14,481 n.6.
18. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,001, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,507 (May 9, 1985) (pro-
posed May 8, 1985).
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linkage was designed to accept "away from the market" orders,1 9 to be held
by the receiving exchange for execution when possible and subject to limited
trade-through protection.2 ° The Commission heralded this first-ever link be-
tween two primary markets in the United States and Canada, 2 but stressed
that increased surveillance would be necessary because trading would be di-
rected out of the United States onto a foreign exchange. The Commission
noted the extensive cooperation between the two exchanges, and assurances
of cooperation that it received from the Ontario Securities Commission.22
The Commission approved the link in the late fall of 1985. Trading began in
seven securities listed on both exchanges, but the participants indicated that
they intended to expand it to include all dually-listed securities.
2 3
Reviews of these United States-Canada links have been mixed. The low
trading volume and the one-way operation in the case of the Boston-Mon-
treal link have been cited as indications of lack of interest on the part of the
traders and ineffective design by the exchanges.24 One Commission staff
member indicated that "it is clear that these links will not dramatically
change the Canadian or American markets. They will, however, encourage
international trading."
'25
Limited success did not stop the expansion of the links, however. The
newest United States-Canada trading arrangement appeared shortly after the
Amex-Toronto proposal, when the Midwest Stock Exchange filed rule pro-
posals with the Commission to implement a similar link with Toronto. Like
the Amex link, it was intended to eventually provide for two-way trading in
all dually-listed stocks and the submission of away-from-the-market or-
19. Initially, the linkage provided only for marketable orders, as with the Boston-Mon-
treal linkage. Id.
20. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussion of trade-through protection
in the Intermarket Trading System).
21. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201, 39,201 n.5 (Sept.
27, 1985) (order approving proposed rule change).
22. Id. at 39,204-06.
23. Id. at 39,201. Seventeen securities are currently trading through the link. See infra
note 116 and accompanying text.
24. Clements, supra note 3, at 180. When Clements wrote in May of 1986, the Amex-
Toronto link generated less than 10 orders a day, and the Boston-Montreal link 30 to 50.
Critics of the links included Philadelphia Board of Trade President Arnold Staloff (" 'It sounds
sexy; it gets media attention; but it's a lot of fluff' ") and Vancouver Stock Exchange President
Donald Hudson ("'It's OK to be all things to all men but you have to end up with some
trading. With links, you have to make sure the trading is going both ways.' "). Id. But see
Table 1 and supra note 8 (trading volume through Boston-Montreal link is larger than the
others, although still a small percentage of total trading).
25. Ketchum, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Regulating Interna-
tional Securities Trading: Looking to the Future, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 33, 36 (1986).
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ders.26 The proposed linkage was approved by the Commission in the spring
of 1986.27 In its notice of approval, the Commission noted, as it did in ap-
proving the Amex-Toronto link, that cooperative efforts in surveillance
would be made by the two exchanges, the Commission, and the Ontario
Securities Commission.2"
The next development in linkages was a move into yet another type of
security. In mid-1985, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and the Options
Clearing Corporation (OCC) filed proposed rule changes to link trading of
foreign currency options with the London Stock Exchange.2 9 Under the
proposal, foreign currency options with the same terms would be fungible;
positions taken on one exchange could be liquidated on the linked ex-
change.30 However, the Commodity Exchange Act could prevent full two-
way trading, because it may not allow United States persons to trade on a
foreign exchange.3 I Although the proposals were last updated in early
26. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,136, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,501 (June 19, 1985).
27. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854 (Apr. 7, 1986).
28. "The exchanges have provided for surveillance and information sharing procedures
similar to those in use in connection with the Amex-[Toronto] linkage. Likewise the SEC and
[the Ontario Securities Commission] have reiterated their commitment to an open and cooper-
ative flow of information." Id. at 11,858.
29. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,354, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,340 (Aug. 30, 1985)
(Options Clearing Corp. rule proposal); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,343, 50 Fed.
Reg. 34,955 (Aug. 28, 1985) (background on proposed linkage).
The London Stock Exchange recently changed its name to the International Stock Exchange
of the United Kingdom and Ireland. Grant, Midwest Discussing Trading Link with London,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Feb. 9, 1987, at 8. It is still routinely referred to as "London"
or the "London Stock Exchange." See, e.g., id.
30. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,354, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,340, 35,343 (Aug. 30,
1985).
31. This is the result of the distribution of jurisdiction between the SEC and the CFTC.
Foreign currency options traded on a national securities exchange are "securities." Securities
Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l0) (1982). The SEC generally has jurisdiction
over these. Id. § 9(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(g). Otherwise, foreign currency is considered a "com-
modity" and all other foreign currency options are contracts for future delivery of that com-
modity. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Prior to its amendment
in 1982, the Commodity Exchange Act was usually interpreted to prohibit transactions in
these options unless through a member of a CFTC-designated contract market. See id. §§ 4,
4(h), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 6(h) (1976) (amended 1982); Regulation of Foreign Futures Transactions
in the United States, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,963, 29,966 (1984) (CFTC advance notice of proposed
rulemaking); I P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION 206-12 (1982). Thus, transactions
on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange are not subject to § 4 of the Commodity Exchange Act,
but transactions on the London Stock Exchange (not through members of a designated con-
tract market) would have violated this provision. Similar overseas links by commodities mar-
kets would not have been prohibited, because the trading takes place through a designated
contract market as required by the Commodity Exchange Act. See id.
The Commodity Exchange Act was amended in 1982 to give the CFTC authority to permit
domestic trading of foreign futures contracts. Regulation of Foreign Futures Transactions in
the United States, supra, at 29,963; see Commodity Exchange Act § 4(b), 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)
19871
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1986,32 no further action has been taken by either party.
A few weeks after the latest update of the Philadelphia-London proposal,
Amex announced that it had arranged for trading of the Major Market In-
dex on the European Options Exchange (EOE) in Amsterdam."3 The ar-
rangement is similar to that between Philadelphia and London; the options
traded on Amex and the EOE would be fungible, and all clearing and settle-
ment would take place through the OCC in the United States.34
In the spring of 1986, another link with the London Stock Exchange was
developed. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD)
sought and received approval of a quotation linkage.35 The program pro-
vides for display through the National Association of Securities Dealers' Au-
tomated Quotation System (NASDAQ) of quotations for securities of the
most highly-capitalized United Kingdom domestic companies, all individual
market-maker quotations in non-United Kingdon securities, and the Finan-
cial Times/Stock Exchange 100 Index. In return, the London Stock Ex-
change's Topic system will display all individual market-maker quotations in
selected NASDAQ securities and the NASDAQ- 100 index, as well as quota-
tions for American Depository Receipts of non-United Kingdom compa-
nies.3 6 In approving the agreement on a pilot basis,37 the Commission noted
that the NASD-London quotation linkage did not raise the same enforce-
ment concerns as did the previously approved exchange trading links.38
However, London and the NASD have indicated that they would be explor-
ing following establishment of the quotation link with settlement and trading
(1982). In 1986, the CFTC proposed rules regulating foreign futures transactions. See For-
eign Options and Foreign Futures Transactions, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,104 (1986). Trading through
a link agreement would be exempt from the proposed regulations; both the CME-SIMEX and
the Comex-Sydney links are cited as examples. Id. at 12,108.
32. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,847, 51 Fed. Reg. 4551 (Feb. 5, 1986).
33. Amex Says Options Will Trade in Amsterdam, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1986, at 5, col. 3.
34. American Stock Exchange, Press Release 2 (Feb. 19, 1986).
35. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,989 (Apr. 29, 1986)
(approving proposed rule changes); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,022, 51 Fed. Reg.
9738 (Mar. 20, 1986) (publishing proposed rule changes for comment).
36. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,022, 51 Fed. Reg. 9738, 9738-39 (Mar. 20,
1986). NASDAQ will be providing quotations in roughly 270 securities through London's
Topic system, and London will be providing quotations in about 390 securities through NAS-
DAQ. Link or Lose, THE EcONOMIST, Apr. 26, 1986, at 87.
37. The Commission gave its initial approval for only six months, in order to monitor
operation of the system in light of objections filed by Instinet, Corp. that the NASD-London
linkage would have certain anticompetitive effects. Securities Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed.
Reg. 15,989, 15,991 (Apr. 29, 1986). That approval has been extended, most recently to June
3, 1987, with the Commission suggesting that the NASD submit its two-year pilot proposal by
that time. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24,292, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,578 (Apr. 9, 1987).
38. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,989, 15,990 (Apr. 9,
1986).
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links.39
The quotation linkage with the NASD and the proposed options linkage
with the Philadelphia Stock Exchange are only two of many efforts to link
with London. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),' the Midwest
Stock Exchange,4 and the Chicago Board of Trade42 are all discussing ar-
rangements with their London counterparts.
The most recent development in international linkage is in the commodi-
ties market, where linkage began. In mid-1986, the Commodity Exchange,
Inc. (Comex) sought and received approval from the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission for a trading link with the Sydney Futures Exchange.43
In contrast to the "mutual offset" system of the CME-SIMEX arrange-
39. Link or Lose, supra note 36, at 87. Recently, the NASD announced a similar quota-
tion sharing arrangement with the Stock Exchange of Singapore. Each market will give the
day's closing quotes to the other market. Smith, NASD Will Exchange Price Quotations With
Singapore on 50 Big OTC Stocks, Wall St. J., May 6, 1987, at 40, col. 1.
40. The New York Stock Exchange was expected to follow the NASD linkage announce-
ment with one of their own. See Link or Lose, supra note 36, at 87; Clements, supra note 3, at
180. Although tentative discussions have been repeatedly publicized, no formal arrangements
have been disclosed. See McMurray & Andrews, Big Board, London Exchange Discuss Trad-
ing, Data-Reporting Joint Ventures, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
Recently, the NYSE has twice changed its position on whether member firms can trade
NYSE-listed securities in London during New York trading hours. Initially, the NYSE stated
that trades in London do not violate the NYSE's off-board trading rules. Grant, London
Trades in NYSE-Listed Stocks Don't Violate Rules, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Feb. 23,
1987, at 6. For a discussion of off-board trading, see infra note 67. Subsequently, however,
NYSE President Robert Birnbaum said that trading simultaneous with the NYSE would be
permitted only if it occurs on the floor of the London Stock Exchange because this trading
would be similar to the NYSE's specialist system. This would be a virtual prohibition, how-
ever, since there is little equities trading on the floor of the London Stock Exchange; indeed, it
will be closed next year. Most trading in London now takes place between dealers, similar to
the United States over-the-counter market. Grant, Birnbaum Says NYSE Rules Restrict
London Trading, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 9, 1987, at 10. Then, reversing its posi-
tion again, the NYSE determined that it would defer to the United Kingdom's characteriza-
tion of the London trading system as an "exchange," and therefore suitable for NYSE-member
trading during NYSE hours. Big Board Bows to U.K. on London Exchange's Status, Wall St.
J., Mar. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 2. Most NYSE members trading NYSE-listed equities in London
currently stop when the NYSE opens. London had been expected to eventually challenge this
practice. Grant, supra note 29, at 8. Such a challenge would not be necessary under the
NYSE's current interpretation of its rule.
41. The Midwest Stock Exchange is discussing quotation links, possibly followed by trad-
ing links, with the London Stock Exchange. Grant, supra note 29, at 8.
42. The Chicago Board of Trade and the London International Financial Futures Ex-
change (LIFFE) have agreed to link trading. LIFFE already has a similar agreement with
Sydney. Gilpin, Chicago-London Futures Link Is Set, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1987, at D9;
London Futures Exchange To Open Link With Sydney, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1986, at 20, col. 2.
43. See Commodity Exchange, Inc., Proposed Rule Amendments, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,539
(1986) (notice of rule proposal); CFTC Approves Rules Implementing Trading Link Between
Comex and SFE, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1221 (Aug. 15, 1986) (adoption of proposal).
1987]
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ment," the Comex-Sydney link involves a single clearing association, which
means that "a position established on one exchange could be liquidated on
the linked exchange."4 5 The trading, initially proposed in a gold bullion
futures contract, takes place in a single trading day that begins in Sydney
and ends in New York.46
Thus, in less than three years, nine markets have been linked for trading
and two others to share quotation information. Commentators have charac-
terized this as an "intensely competitive" environment,4 7 with the world's
exchanges attempting to defend their central market system against "the on-
slaught of ... canny information providers."48
II. PURPOSES OF MARKET LINKAGES
To be fully understood, the development of market linkages should be
examined against a background of economic theory. This part of the Article
develops that theory, and includes rationales for the existence of brokers,
dealers, specialists, and exchange markets. These theories will then be ap-
plied to the "prototype" linkage of domestic markets, the Intermarket Trad-
ing System, and to the market linkages that were discussed in Part I: the
securities market links, the commodities market links, and quotation links.
Other reasons for market links will be examined, and the development of
these links will be compared with the development of inter-dealer or "up-
stairs" trading.
A. The Economics of Market Development
The economic theory of market development begins with the realization
that transaction costs exist. A buyer has costs of searching for a potential
seller, and vice versa.4 9 If buyers and sellers use brokers to perform this
task, their expected search costs will be lower. This is true even if the bro-
44. See discussion of the CME-SIMEX link, supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
45. See Commodity Exchange, Inc., Proposed Rule Amendments, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,539
(1986) (proposed Apr. 11, 1986).
46. Id.
47. Clements, supra note 3, at 183.
48. Link or Lose, supra note 36, at 87.
49. This is micro-economic or price theory. It differs from traditional price theory be-
cause: transaction costs exist, price changes may not indicate extrinsic shifts in supply or
demand, and random-walk pricing generally does not hold. R. WEST & S. TINic, THE EcO-
NOMICS OF THE STOCK MARKET 26-28 (1971); see also Glosten & Milgrom, Bid, Ask and
Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN.
ECON. 71, 71-72 (1985). "Classical price theory ... has little to say about the dynamics of
matching buyers and sellers." Id.
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ker's cost to conduct each search is the same as the individual's cost.5"
Researchers have simulated broker-based markets, treating incoming or-
ders as random events.5 ' This simulated broker market is more liquid than
one of individuals undertaking their own searches for willing buyers and
sellers. Liquidity here is defined as "a market characteristic that enables
investors to dispose of or purchase securities at a price reasonably related to
the preceding price.'"52
However, these simulated markets break down when "market orders" are
permitted, that is, if individual buyers and sellers do not have to specify a
price. Individuals who enter "market" orders confound the market when
their orders cross: a "market" buy order and a "market" sell order cannot
be executed mechanically. The market is illiquid because a price to execute
this transaction is not required to be related to preceding prices.53 In order
to handle market orders and imbalances, the market requires a dealer trad-
ing for his own account.54
The presence of a dealer creates the familiar bid-ask spread that character-
izes securities markets. The dealer profits by buying slightly below the equi-
librium price and selling slightly above it.5" Subsequently, because the
equilibrium price may vary, there will be traders willing to transact on these
terms. "Price fluctuations.., provide a rationale for the presence of individ-
uals who simultaneously maintain limit orders to buy and sell stocks."56
The dealer's standing buy and sell prices reduce variability of the market,
because traders know what the price will be and they no longer have to wait
to "match" an incoming order on the other side.57 The spread is the price
paid for this liquidity or "predictable immediacy."58 Reduced price variabil-
50. R. WEST & S. T1NIC, supra note 49, at 32.
51. West and Tinic build simulation models. Id. at 33-34. They recognize the earlier
work in simulation by George Stigler. Id.; see Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Mar-
kets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964); see also Hakansson, Beja & Kale, On the Feasibility of Automated
Market Making by a Programmed Specialist, 40 J. FIN. 1, 6-7 (1985) (recent market simulation
model).
52. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market
System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 886 (1981).
53. See id. (definition of liquidity). As a practical matter, of course, individuals would not
enter "market" orders if, when matched with a corresponding "market" order, they would fail
or would be executed at an arbitrary price.
54. In this context, the term "dealer" could apply either to a market maker or an ex-
change specialist.
55. R. WEST & S. TINIC, supra note 49, at 34-35.
56. Id. at 34.
57. Id. at 37.
58. Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 35-36 (1968); accord Benston &
Hagerman, Determinants of Bid-Asked Spreads in the Over-the-Counter Market, 1 J. FIN.
ECON. 353, 354 (1974) ("The price charged for this product [immediate exchange] is the
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ity reduces transaction costs, contributing to economic efficiency.59 Thus,
markets with brokers and dealers are more efficient markets than those com-
posed of individuals standing alone.
This theory suggests that brokers and dealers are beneficial to buyers and
sellers. It does not explain, however, why brokers and dealers exist in mar-
kets for some goods, such as securities, but not others. More importantly, it
does not explain how the prices of broker and dealer services are set. To
answer these questions, we must examine the "market for markets," that is,
the demand for and supply of broker and dealer services.
Broker and dealer services are a separate economic good, although they
are complimentary to the underlying stock.' The service a broker or dealer
provides is "marketability," which is measured by the waiting time in dis-
posing of the stock and the difference between the price received and the
price that would be obtained at an equilibrium, if all buy and sell orders
reached the market simultaneously.6'
Marketability is demanded by sellers or buyers who are willing to trade
price for immediate execution. Marketability is supplied by dealers or spe-
cialists who balance the supply and demand of stocks over time. The cost of
marketability to buyers will be the same as it is to sellers, that is, the differ-
ence between the price which they obtain on immediate execution and the
price they would obtain when a willing buyer or seller entered the market.62
In a competitive market for marketability services, this difference will equal
the dealer's or specialist's marginal cost of carrying inventories.63
spread."); Hamilton, Marketplace Organization and Marketability: NASDAQ the Stock Ex-
change, and the National Market System, 33 J. FIN. 487 n.2 (1978) ("The price of marketabil-
ity generally has been represented as the difference or spread between bid and ask prices.");
Tinic, The Economics of Liquidity Services, 86 Q.J. ECON. 79, 87 (1972).
59. See Poser, supra note 52, at 906-07 (discussing the term "economically efficient
execution").
60. "[I]f an increase in price of either [broker or dealer] service (with all other prices
unchanged) reduces the amount demanded by traders, it also reduces the demand for the stock
itself." R. WEST & S. TINIC, supra note 49, at 80. Thus, even if stock prices do not change,
substitutions in investors' portfolios might still occur because of variations in relative prices of
broker or dealer services. Id. at 81.
61. Id. at 85. For the purpose of analyzing the securities markets, we can treat waiting
time as insignificant. The spread alone is usually considered the price for immediate execution,
see, e.g., Benston & Hagerman, supra note 58, at 354, and thus waiting time does not usually
enter formal analysis.
62. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63. R. WEST & S. TINIC, supra note 49, at 86-100; Beja & Hakansson, From Orders to
Trades: Some Alternative Market Mechanisms, in IMPENDING CHANGES FOR SECURITIES
MARKETS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EXCHANGES? 157-58 (E. Bloch & R. Schwartz eds. 1979);
Tinic, supra note 58, at 80. Other transaction costs may also be included in the spread. See
Benston & Hagerman, supra note 58, at 354-55.
The pricing of dealer services is the subject of much theoretical and empirical study. For a
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These theories suggest why markets are created for the exchange of securi-
ties and how those exchange services are priced. They do not explain why
some markets are organized around specialists and others around dealers.
The above discussions did not differentiate between the two, but merely de-
fined a dealer as one who holds inventory." For the purpose of explaining
the linkage of markets, it is only necessary to note the differences between
the two types of dealers without reaching a conclusion about which is
''superior."
Dealers facilitate immediate execution of trades by purchasing or selling
from inventory to "create" the "other side" of a transaction. The hallmark
of a stock exchange is that this latter function is performed by a specialist:
an individual trader who is obligated to maintain a fair and orderly mar-
ket.65 The specialist maintains a monopolist's or monopsonist's position;66
according to exchange rules, trading in the specialist's security must gener-
ally take place through the specialist or be exposed to orders in the special-
ist's book or to "the crowd" at the specialist's post.67
The nature of the specialist's obligation, standing ready to buy or sell,
demands a fairly continuous market. If orders are infrequent or large, the
market will be unbalanced, and the specialist has no alternative but to take
the excess into inventory or sell out of inventory until prices adjust. Dealers,
theoretical background, see Garman, Market Microstructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 257 (1976);
Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 49. Empirical work in this area includes Directorate of Eco-
nomic and Policy Analysis and Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Staff Studies of Multiple Trading of Options (1986); Benston & Hagerman, supra note
58; Branch & Freed, Bid-Asked Spreads on the Amex and the Big Board, 32 J. FIN. 159 (1977);
Hamilton, supra note 58; Ho & Macris, Dealer Bid-Ask Quotes and Transaction Prices: An
Empirical Study of Some AMEX Options, 39 J. FIN. 23 (1984); Ho & Stoll, On Dealer Markets
Under Competition, 35 J. FIN. 259 (1980).
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 104, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2104 (as
amended Aug. 9, 1976); Stoll, The Stock Exchange Specialist System: An Economic Analysis
6-10 (Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Graduate School of
Business Administration, New York University, Monograph 1985) (discussion of roles of the
specialist: auctioneer, broker, dealer and bystander).
66. See Stoll, supra note 65, at 24-25 (detailing economic theory of the specialist's monop-
oly profit); Ho & Stoll, supra note 63, at 259 ("the NYSE specialist ... has a quasi monopoly
position"); Hamilton, supra note 58, at 488 ("Previous theoretical analysis of the pricing of
marketability has mostly concerned the NYSE specialists, which are monopoly (or near mo-
nopoly) dealer firms.").
67. This is a result of the so-called "off-board trading restrictions" of the exchanges. See,
e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 390, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2390 (adopted Mar. 31,
1976); see Stoll, supra note 65, at 32-33 (discussion of specialist's "monopoly power" and rule
390). Rules 19c-I and 19c-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 generally prohibit
exchanges from preventing off-board agency transactions, and prohibit exchanges from
preventing off-board principal transactions in securities listed or admitted to unlisted trading
privileges on an exchange after April 29, 1979. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.19c-1, 240.19c-3 (1986).
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on the other hand, have the flexibility to "shop" an order and have the dis-
cretion not to take a position. "For this very reason, the over-the-counter
dealer can do a better job than an exchange specialist in making a market for
stocks having order flows that are thin or unbalanced." '6' This theory has
been supported by evidence indicating that specialists have low trading costs
in active markets, 69 and also by empirical testing of components of bid-ask
spreads and stock price variances.7 °
B. Models of Market Linkage and Their Rationales
1. The Intermarket Trading System
The Intermarket Trading System (ITS) has been described as the "proto-
type" for the other kinds of market linkages.71 It was created in 1978 by
several exchanges through the initiative of the Commission 72 to implement,
68. R. WEST & S. TINIC, supra note 49, at 60. The Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE) has reached the opposite conclusion in proposing to add "designated primary market-
makers" to function as quasi-specialists on the CBOE trading floor. These specialists are being
added in thinly-traded options, where market makers do not perform as well, according to
CBOE officials. McMurray, CBOE Approves Trading System Aimed at Growth, Wall St. J.,
May 1, 1987, at 36, col. 1.
69. Hakansson, Beja & Kale, supra note 51, at 18 (simulated trading with an automated
specialist, assuming change in price between trades is no more than one-eighth point, the cost
of "demand smoothing" is estimated at one-third cent per share). Neither this study nor R.
WEST & S. TINIC, supra note 49, at 60, nor those discussed infra note 70 and accompanying
text, suggest a causal relationship between specialist or dealer markets and bid-asked spreads.
But see Stoll, supra note 65, at 40-41 (citing a study which concludes that spreads are lower on
the NYSE than on NASDAQ, and offering various explanations).
70. Tinic concludes that
[d]ealers can make better markets for stocks in which there are greater opportunities
for self-equating block transactions. Therefore common stock issues with a larger
number of institutional investors possess better marketability than others in which
only a few investors hold very large blocks.
Prices of liquidity (illiquidity) services are more stable for stocks that experience
continuous trading activity, a larger number of transactions, and lower prices.
Tinic, supra note 58, at 93. See also Cohen, Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb, The Returns Gen-
eration Process Returns Variance, and the Effect of Thinness in Securities Markets, 33 J. FIN.
149, 150 (1978) and studies cited therein (thinness of markets leads to greater variance, and
"on non-specialist exchanges, variance is greater for thinner issues").
71. Bernard, Case Studies in International Market Structure Issues: Market and Clearing
Linkages in Broker-Dealer Institute 1986: New Products, 24-Hour Trading, Financial Struc-
tures, Market Information 96 (Practicing Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 539, 1986). These other types of linkages are order-flow linkages, mu-
tual offset systems, and market data linkages. Id. at 100-11. These are discussed in the re-
mainder of section II(B).
72. The initial ITS plan was submitted by the New York, American, Boston, Pacific, and
Philadelphia Stock Exchanges and published by the Commission. See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 14,416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354 (Feb. 1, 1978). The initial ITS operation was between
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in part, the congressional directives of the National Market System legisla-
tion. 3 The Commission initially proposed to link brokers directly, automat-
ically routing any order to the market with the best price. 4 Securities
exchanges and brokerage firms objected to this proposal because they be-
lieved that it would eliminate broker discretion, and that price should not be
the sole trade determinant. The Commission realized that it would be im-
practicable to impose such a system on the exchanges over their objection,
and deferred this idea.75
The ITS plan as approved by the Commission provided for immediate
order routing but not automatic execution.76 ITS routes "commitments to
trade" from one market to another.77 Commitments to trade are firm obli-
gations, usually expiring after one minute, to buy or sell. 78 The plan also
provided for composite quotations, so that traders could determine the best
overall bid or offer from any participating exchange.79 Problems arose when
traders in one market would "trade through" or ignore a better quote sent
through ITS from another market.80 The participants have taken corrective
New York and Philadelphia; other participants were added a few months later. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed. Reg. 4938, 4939 (Feb. 3, 1983).
73. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354, 4354 (Feb. 1, 1978).
Section 1 A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982) di-
rects the Securities and Exchange Commission "to facilitate the establishment of a national
market system for securities." Section 1 A(a)(I)(D) contains congressional findings that mar-
ket linkages will, among other things, "foster efficiency" and "enhance competition." Id.
§ 78k-l(a)(1)(D). See generally J. SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 1-80
(1985) (discussing the future of the National Market System).
74. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 73, at 16; Poser, supra note 52, at 924.
75. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354, 4362 (Feb. 1, 1978);
Poser, supra note 52, at 924-25. The idea of automated order routing survived, however. The
Cincinnati Stock Exchange set up an "automated exchange" concurrently with the ITS. Id. at
926-27. The study of automated trading continues in the literature. See, e.g., Hakansson, Beja
& Kale, supra note 51. Although the Commission did not adopt the idea of automatic execu-
tion, it noted that "[t]his type of proposal has been advanced with considerable conviction by
responsible persons and, if perfected, would appear to have the potential for significant efficien-
cies in securities trading." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354,
4362 (Feb. 1, 1978).
76. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,661, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,419, 17,420 (Apr.
24, 1978).
77. The ITS as finally adopted is explained in detail in Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 19,456, 48 Fed. Reg. 4938 (Feb. 3, 1983).
78. If a commitment to trade is accepted at the receiving market, the trade is made and
execution confirmed; if it is not accepted, the commitment expires. Id. at 4939.
79. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,661, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,419, 17,420 (Apr.
24, 1978).
80. "A 'trade-through' occurs when an execution takes place in one ITS market center at
a time when another ITS market center is offering a better price. The Commission tradition-
ally has viewed the occurrence of trade-throughs as 'unacceptable in an evolving national mar-
ket system.' " Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed. Reg. 4938, 4939 n. 1
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measures in this area, and the Commission believes trade-throughs are no
longer a serious problem."' ITS is primitive compared to other routing or
linkage systems because it is only a broker-to-broker link, not a broker-to-
market link. 2 Nonetheless, it "is enthusiastically supported by the stock
exchanges because it preserves a function for their floor members and does
not threaten the central role of the specialist." 3
ITS has been approved by the Commission for an indefinite period,
8 4
although ITS trading does not account for much market volume.8 5 The
Commission staff has concluded that ITS has had no "statistically significant
effect on the quality of the primary market,",16 and also found that the main
impact of ITS was on the size of quotes (number of shares), which was sig-
nificantly larger for ITS stocks. s7
The Commission's experience with ITS suggests that it has had a very
limited effect on market efficiency. This may be due, in part, to the domi-
nance of the New York Stock Exchange in trading in these securities,
88
(Feb. 3, 1983) (quoting Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,671, 44 Fed. Reg. 20,360,
20,364 n.35 (Apr. 4, 1979)).
81. Rules to limit trade-throughs were adopted for the exchanges and the NASD. See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,704, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,520 (Apr. 17, 1981); Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 19,249, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,552 (Nov. 26, 1982). In its final approval
of ITS, the Commission noted that it "has identified less than one percent of ITS transactions
as involving potential trade-throughs." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed.
Reg. 4938, 4939 (Feb. 3, 1983).
82. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 73, at 16; Poser, supra note 52, at 924.
83. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 73, at 17.
84. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed. Reg. 4938 (Feb. 3, 1983).
85. "By 1981, . . . [ITS volume] had stabilized at about 4 percent of composite volume,
and it remains at that level today." Davis, The Intermarket Trading System and the Cincinnati
Experiment in MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES IN-
DUSTRY 271 (Y. Amihud, T. Ho & R. Schwartz eds. 1985).
86. M. FITIERMAN & R. COLBY, THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM: A SELECTIVE
OUTLINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 1971-1985, at 27 (1985). The Commission staff concluded
that ITS did not significantly impact the spreads or price volatility of ITS stocks. DIRECTOR-
ATE OF ECONOMIC AND POLICY ANALYSIS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A
MONITORING REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE INTERMARKET TRADING SYSTEM: 1978-
1981, June 1982, at 39-40, 47-48 [hereinafter MONITORING REPORT].
87. The MONITORING REPORT, supra note 86, noted that, in general, larger quote size
improves market quality because it decreases the number of transactions necessary to fill an
order. Id. at 40-41. Data from ITS trading show that the average quote size was larger in ITS
stocks in all markets and grew over time. Id. at 41-44. The New York Stock Exchange esti-
mated that the superior prices available through ITS saved investors $40 million through 1981.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed. Reg. 4938, 4940 (Feb. 3, 1983) (citing
1981 N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE ANN. REP. 10-11).
88. Although the NYSE participates in transactions accounting for about 90 per-
cent of total ITS volume, the share volume of ITS trades completed on the NYSE is
less than 3 percent of total NYSE share volume .... The regional exchanges ...
derive a sizable portion of their volume from the ITS. [M]ost of the regionals' ITS
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which suggests that ITS was superimposed on a pre-existing centralized
market. Indeed, the limited impact of ITS may be due in part to the prefer-
ence of traders for a centralized marketplace.8 9
Despite these limitations, ITS may have contributed to economic effi-
ciency in two ways. It has resulted in larger quotes which may reduce the
number of transactions9' and thus lower transaction costs. In addition, the
Commission noted that ITS increases the ability of regional and over-the-
counter market makers to use superior quotations to attract order flow from
the primary exchanges. 91 Although these contributions may indeed be effi-
ciencies, they are not of a magnitude that would move these markets to cre-
ate ITS on their own as a profit maximization strategy. ITS is of limited use
as an economic model because it was created under strong direction from the
Commission. 92 The practical experience of ITS trading, however, might
volume is transacted with the NYSE, and most of this volume results from commit-
ments sent to the NYSE from the regional exchanges.
Davis, supra note 85, at 271-72.
The NYSE accounts for 82% of all share volume and 85% of all dollar volume in exchange-
traded securities. See Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 8, at 132. "Most trad-
ing in ITS Stocks occurs on the floor of the NYSE without the use of ITS." MONITORING
REPORT, supra note 86, at 16.
89. See Ketchum, supra note 25, at 35 ("Any efforts the Commission has made to en-
courage competition in the markets in this country has [sic] run up against the clear preference
of the securities industry for centralization in one marketplace.").
90. See supra note 87. None of the literature examined in part II(A) explicitly included
quote size in theories of supply of and demand for marketability services.
91. The Commission has suggested that the secondary market makers may "attract orders
by disseminating superior quotations." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed.
Reg. 4938, 4940 (Feb. 3, 1983). The Commission staff, however, found no significant statisti-
cal effect of ITS on spreads, see MONITORING REPORT, supra note 86, at 40; Davis, supra note
85, at 274. Therefore, this increased participation of regional and over-the-counter market
makers would theoretically increase economic efficiency through potential competition which
would keep the primary market spreads narrow. On the role of potential competition in this
area, see J. SELIGMAN, supra note 73, at 49-50. The regional stock exchanges' limited capacity
may also limit the effectiveness of their competition. See The Future of the Exchanges, FIN.
WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at 70 ("[T]he brokerages have learned [because of ITS] that they can
save as much as 20% on floor trading by sending one-fourth of their orders to the eager region-
als, which lack the liquidity to handle much more."). Id. at 72-73.
92. See Karmel, Can Regulators of International Capital Markets Strike a Balance Be-
tween Competing Interests?, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 105, 108-09 (1986) ("Whether [ITS] will provide
a model for international linkages time will tell, but ... I will note there are no super-regula-
tory agencies to compel the kind of cooperation that was necessary among various United
States exchanges in order to develop ITS.").
Strictly speaking, the Commission did not dictate the form of ITS, but it did heavily pres-
sure the industry to devise its own plan. In its concept release on development of a national
market system in 1978, the Commission noted that
[w]hile [it] believes that development of a national market system should remain
essentially at evolutionary process, free of the rigidities inherent in any Commission
attempt to dictate the ultimate configuration of that system, that development has
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serve to decrease the technological and learning costs of future market links.
2. Securities Market Links
There are currently three trading linkages between the United States and
Canada that connect five exchanges. Boston and Montreal have developed a
one-way link that enables orders for Boston-listed and ITS stocks to be
placed from Montreal. The Amex-Toronto and Midwest-Toronto links pro-
vide for or anticipate two-way trading in all dually-listed stocks.
The Boston-Montreal link appears to be a simple order-routing arrange-
ment. Boston executes orders (for its usual fees) for Montreal traders, just
like other traders.93 Boston specialists benefit from increased order flow to
the extent the linkage brings orders to Boston that would have been executed
elsewhere or not entered at all. 94 If the new trading occurs in dually-listed
stocks, the trading activity presumably would be moving to Boston from
Montreal. If the new trading is in stocks not traded in Montreal, it would be
moving to Boston from a dealer.95 Alternatively, the new trading could re-
sult from investors who are attracted to the linkage, forsaking other
investments.
In each of these above examples, traders would come to Boston only in
lieu of other trading intermediaries. The economic theories discussed above
indicate that traders use intermediaries to reduce costs and to achieve flexi-
bility in orders.96 In order to be effective, therefore, the linkage must reduce
been impeded by the inability of the several discrete segments of the securities indus-
try to surmount the problems presented by the diversity of their interests and to settle
upon a common course of action to implement the Congressional policy.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354, 4357 (Feb. 1, 1978); see J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 73, at 51-53 (discussing the "conservative approach of [former SEC]
Chairman Williams" to development of a national market system).
93. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,324, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,200, 37,200 (Sept.
21, 1984) ("The BSE (Boston Stock Exchange] shall bill the Montreal member for standard
trade recording and value charges.").
94. "The ... linkage will enable the BSE to attract additional order flow which in turn
enhances the depth and liquidity of the markets of BSE specialists." Id.
95. The extent of trading by other entities would depend on the particular stock involved.
As ultimately implemented, the link includes Canadian national companies whose stock is
traded in Boston, and all ITS-eligible securities traded in Boston. Id. at 37,200; Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 21,603, 50 Fed. Reg. 908, 908 (Jan. 7, 1985). Either of these cate-
gories could include stocks also traded in Montreal. Independent of trading in Montreal, these
stocks could be traded by dealers in the United States only if they are not subject to an ex-
change's off-board trading restrictions. See supra note 67. There is generally very little off-
board trading in Canada. Grass, US./Canadian Trading Markets-What's the Difference?,
SECURITIES TRADERS' MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 12.
96. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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the trader's costs, or make it possible to execute trades in Boston that other
markets would turn away.
Costs would be reduced or services would be enhanced if execution costs
in Boston were already lower than any other alternative, or if the physical
link itself reduced costs. In the former case, there would be no need for a
formal link; business would flow to Boston because of its lower costs. 9 7
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the physical link is expected to
reduce transaction costs of Montreal traders.98
This explains why the Boston-Montreal linkage could be viable even with
relatively small order flow. Boston specialists are compensated directly, and
Montreal traders have the benefit of lower execution costs. In the case of the
Boston specialists, a larger order flow might result in cost savings, either
from economies of scale99 or lower inventories, I°° but a small order flow is
not necessarily unprofitable.
The Amex and Midwest linkages with Toronto are different in many ways
from the Boston-Montreal arrangement. Trading is two way;101 it is limited
to dually-listed stocks, and it can include "away from the market" orders as
well as market orders.I12 These differences suggest that different economic
motivations underlie these linkages.
Theoretical analysis of these linkages begins from the same point: the
linkage should be successful only if it reduces transaction costs, by reducing
the direct costs of the specialist or by providing better execution.'0 3 The
Commission stated that each linkage could provide increased market compe-
tition and greater liquidity"° which involves similar theoretical assump-
tions. Market competition would "increase," meaning spreads would
97. Loss of business to United States exchanges is one reason given for the interest of the
Canadian markets in linkages; another is the continuing competition between Montreal and
Toronto for listings. Parallel Markets, ECONOMIST, May 18, 1985, at 87.
98. For example, in Phase I of the linkage, computer terminals were placed on the floor of
the Montreal exchange, allowing traders there to route orders directly to Boston. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 21,449, 49 Fed. Reg. 44,575, 44,575 (Nov. 7, 1984). In Phase II,
computer terminals were placed on the floor of the Boston exchange which are connected to
Montreal's automatic order-routing system. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,603, 50
Fed. Reg. 907, 908 (Jan. 7, 1985). Either of these arrangements would reduce transaction
costs for the Montreal trader, the second even more than the first.
99. Certain economies of scale have been documented in specialist operations. See Stoll,
supra note 65, at 20-21.
100. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
101. Currently, all Boston-Montreal trading takes place in Boston, but the exchanges have
planned "Phase III" of their linkage, which would include northbound trading. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201, 39,201 n.6 (Sept. 27, 1985).
102. Initially, however, the link is set up to transmit only marketable orders. Id. at 39,202.
103. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
104. See Securities Act Release No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854, 11,857 (Apr. 7, 1986)
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narrow, 05 if there are barriers between the markets in the United States and
Canada such that brokerage services are not competitively priced now, or if
the linkage itself generates cost savings that alter the dealers' marginal
costs. 106 Liquidity would be greater if volume increases by the nature of the
specialist's function. However, all other things being equal, linked trading
alone would not be expected to increase overall trading volume.
Thus, the success of this type of link depends on cost savings resulting
from the existence of the link itself. Furthermore, these cost savings would
not result from trading leaving one of the exchanges because it has higher
overall costs; if that were the preexisting cost structure, the higher-cost ex-
change would have no incentive to link with its competition. The cost re-
ductions must be expected from the ability to "pick off" trades from the
other market with a better quote.'1 7 Sometimes the United States specialist
would get the trade, other times it would go to the Toronto trader. But, if
absent the linkage these willing trades would go unsatisfied, then the linkage
would lower costs. Once costs are lowered, the volume would be expected to
increase,10 8 which would lower costs still further.109
The United States experience with ITS may provide a useful analogy to
the development of the Toronto-United States linkages. The features of both
(Midwest-Toronto link); Securities Act Release No. 22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201, 39,203 (Sept.
27, 1985) (Amex-Toronto link).
105. In the releases approving the linkages, the Commission did not specify what it meant
by "increasing" competition. It can be assumed that the competition is expected to have some
measurable impact on costs in order to be "increasing." Competition in the abstract, without
any perceived impact on costs or prices, may be of some value, but it is difficult to measure.
106. This could happen, for example, if the total trading on the two exchanges generates
economies of scale which are not present on each exchange separately. These scale economies
would cause trading to go to one market once the two are linked. See supra note 99 and
accompanying text; see also Beja & Hakansson, supra note 63, at 149 (economies of scale from
decreasing market segmentation in a dealer market).
107. The ability to "pick off" better quotes depends, in turn, on effective "trade-through"
protection. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (trade-through problems in the ITS).
The Toronto linkages were originally designed to include "a limited form of trade-through
protection." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,001, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,507 (May 9, 1985).
Both linkages do guarantee execution of certain small market orders. Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201, 39,202 (Sept. 27, 1985) (Amex-Toronto link); Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854, 11,856 (Apr. 7, 1986) (Midwest-
Toronto link). Commenting on the Amex-Toronto linkage, Amex President Kenneth Leibler
noted: "We're not providing a market that someone can't reach any other way .... [b]ut we
have provided one we feel is quicker and more efficient." Hiltzik, Global Trading is Making
SEC Task Tougher, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 17, 1986, pt. IV, at 1, col. 2.
108. Lower costs would increase demand because marketability services are a good compli-
mentary to the stock. The stock itself would thus be a more attractive investment. See supra
note 60 and accompanying text.
109. Increasing volume decreases a specialist's costs. See supra notes 68-70 and accompa-
nying text.
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the Amex-Toronto and Midwest-Toronto agreements resemble ITS in many
important ways, such as dual quotations, two-way trading and trade-
through protection. The trading actually is more than two-way, because al-
most all the linked-trading securities are traded on several exchanges," 0 and
ITS provides access to and for the other United States exchanges.
ITS was found to increase the size of quotations and provide potential, if
not actual, competition from regional exchanges that would keep spreads
small. The benefits of ITS were limited largely because it was superim-
posed upon a system that was already centralized." 2 The Amex and Mid-
west links include primary markets as well" 3 and, therefore, may yield only
small efficiencies due to preexisting centralization. The existence of any po-
tential competition" 4 may keep transaction costs from increasing, but it
would not lower spreads where the cost structure of all competitors is the
same.
Therefore, the Amex and Midwest links with Toronto appear to depend
on drawing significant volume in order to be viable. Each exchange recog-
nized this in its initial filing with the Commission, noting its intention to
expand the linkage to all dually-traded stocks.' 5 Amex has expanded
linked trading to seventeen stocks from its pilot size of seven," 6 and Mid-
west to eighteen from its pilot size of six." 7 Although experience is limited
at this point, trading links are developing in accord with the economic theo-
110. Most of the securities traded in the Amex-Toronto link also trade on the Boston,
Cincinnati, Midwest, Pacific or Philadelphia exchanges. Some also trade on the Alberta, Mon-
treal, Vancouver, and Winnipeg exchanges. All the securities traded in the Midwest-Toronto
link are NYSE-listed. Securities Act Release No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854, 11,855 (Apr. 7,
1986). Most trade on the major regional exchanges as well. See National Quotation Bureau,
Inc., National Monthly Stock Summary (Nov. 1, 1986).
111. See supra notes 87, 91, and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 110.
114. See supra note 91.
115. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201 (Sept. 27, 1985);
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854, 11,855 (Apr. 7, 1986) (Mid-
west link would include all dually-traded stocks that are listed on the New York Stock
Exchange).
116. Letter from Michael Cavalier, American Stock Exchange, to Christine Sakach, Divi-
sion of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 13, 1987). There are
37 stocks dually listed on the Amex and Toronto. Securities Exchange Act Release No.
22,443, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,206, 39,206 n.3 (Sept. 27, 1985) (reduction by Amex of listing fees for
linked securities).
117. Letter from Patrick K. Conroy, Midwest Stock Exchange Inc., to Christine Sakach,
Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 20, 1987). There
are about 62 securities dually listed on the Midwest and Toronto exchanges; all are also listed
on the NYSE. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854, 11,855 (Apr.
7, 1986).
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ries discussed above. Additional reasons for development of these links, in-
volving exchange competition and market positioning, are discussed below.
3. Commodities Market Links
There are currently two operating commodities market linkages involving
United States exchanges: between the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX); and between
the Commodities Exchange (Comex) and the Sydney Futures Exchange.
Although the CME-SIMEX link operates through offsetting clearing posi-
tions while the Comex-Sydney link uses a single clearing agency,' 1 8 the two
arrangements are otherwise similar.
The structure of United States commodities markets and their regulation
differs from the securities markets, which in turn requires new economic
analysis. All trading of commodity futures and options must take place on
designated markets," 9 which means no "over-the-counter" or "upstairs"
trading can compete with an exchange. In addition, multiple trading is very
rare, which means exchanges do not simultaneously compete for trades.,
20
The lack of simultaneous competition removes most incentives to link dis-
cussed above.' 2 ' Without simultaneous trading in the same product avail-
able in the linked market, there will be no increase in volume or narrowing
of spread to reduce traders' costs.
Some competition does exist on futures exchanges outside the United
States which trade similar products. However, these markets are open only
when United States markets are closed; the competition with the United
States markets is sequential. Linkage of these markets does not generate the
high-volume or lower-spread benefits of simultaneous markets because there
can be no aggregation. However, sequential linkage can reduce timing risks.
In discussing economic theories of securities markets, time to execution is
118. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussion of the CME-SIMEX arrange-
ment); supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussion of the Comex-Sydney arrangement).
119. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982); 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 31,
at 206-12. But see Karr, Climb in Off-Exchange Futures Sales Challenges CFTC, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 3, 1987, at 10, col. I (development of financial instruments linked to future commodity
prices is creating a booming off-exchange market).
120. The CFTC discourages direct competition, but does not prohibit it. I P. JOHNSON,
supra note 31, at 225-27. The competition for initial permission to trade a certain contract,
however, can be intense. Id. at 234-36. While it is theoretically possible that two marketplaces
might compete on the basis of lower trading costs, the continued competitive existence of both
marketplaces is not likely. Trading will gravitate to one marketplace. Id. at 225-27, 234-36.
In addition, there are significant substantive barriers to entry. See id. at 214-15 (discussing the
requirements for contract market designation under the Commodity Exchange Act).
121. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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not significant' 2 2 because trading throughout the day, to the extent desired
by traders, is already practical. 12 3 However, the absence of "upstairs" trad-
ing in the commodities markets allows for time-based cost reductions. Trad-
ing costs could be reduced if traders can reach the market sooner because
their search costs will be lower.'24
This theory of sequential linkage of commodity exchanges is borne out by
the reasons given for the development of those linkages. They are viewed as
a way "to share liquidity,"' 2 5 and to reduce overnight risk.'2 6 These sequen-
tial links are analogous to another alternative being implemented by domes-
tic exchanges: longer trading hours.
12 7
Lengthening the trading day, either unilaterally by an exchange or by
linking with an exchange open during different hours, could be expected to
increase volume because it would lower the time component of trading costs,
such as the overnight risk. These lower costs would inure both to dealers
trading for their own account and to their customers. However, these bene-
fits derive in part from the unique nature of commodities market regula-
tion.'2 8 Therefore, as in the review of the ITS linkage,'2 9 the effects of
regulation keep the linkages from being examples of pure economic
motivation.
122. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
123. It is the ability of "upstairs" trading to move around the world and around the clock
that has caused some commentators to downplay sequential trading links by securities mar-
kets. See Internationalization Hearings, supra note 6, at 41, 46-47 (statement of Gordon S.
Macklin, President, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.); id. at 85 (statement of
Donald L. Calvin, Executive Vice President, New York Stock Exchange, Inc.); see also
Shopkorn, Global Trading: The Current and Future Impact on United States Markets and
United States Portfolio Managers, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 25, 28 (1986) (development of significant
over-the-counter international trading requires extensive information links, but not necessarily
trading links). This theory is also evident in the way many discussions about serial securities
market links have progressed. The main focus is information sharing; trading links are put off
until later. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 29, at 16; text accompanying note 39.
124. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
125. Clements, supra note 3, at 179.
126. Malkin, Extraterritorial Application of United States Commodity and Securities Laws
to Market Transactions in an Age of Intercontinental Trading Links, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
351, 354 (1985); CFTC Approves US.-Singapore Link; Expands Trading Day in Three Con-
tracts, supra note 10, at 1457.
127. See Philadelphia Exchange Plans Nighttime Options Trading, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2,
1987, at 25 (description of planned evening session in foreign currency options trading);
CBOT's Opening of Evening Session Attracts a Throng, Wall St. J., May 1, 1987, at 35, col. 1
(description of first CBOT evening trading session).
128. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
129. See Karmel, supra note 92, at 108-09.
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4. Information Links
There is currently one operating link that does not involve trading be-
tween two markets: the "quotation link" between the London Stock Ex-
change's' 30 Topic system and NASDAQ. Each exchange provides compiled
quotations of certain stock prices and stock indexes during normal local
market hours. '3  Neither party charges the other any fees for the service.'3 2
The London-NASD link possesses some unique features relevant to theo-
retical economic analysis. First, the information from the two systems will
not be combined; quotes from each source, even on the same security, will
continue to appear separately.' 33 Second, at least in the United States mar-
ket, the quotes will largely duplicate information currently available. The
London information will not generally be available to NASDAQ's retail cus-
tomers, but only to those who do or could get it from other vendors.'
34
In general, the economic theory of an information link is very much like a
trading link. In order for the link to be successful, it must result in reduced
trading costs. 135 Unlike trading links, however, there is no potential for fur-
ther cost reduction through aggregation of trades; neither trading nor spe-
cialists are involved.' 36 Even if there was trading, this link is not between
exchanges, but among dealers, who have different costs. Dealers' profits re-
sult primarily from their market-making activity, 137 which depends in part
on their ability to "shop" an order. 138 Dealers incur costs in "shopping" an
order that specialists do not because all trades are brought before the special-
ist. 139 The availability of more information through a quotation link would
reduce a dealer's "shopping" costs, provided that the linked quotations are
useful.' 40 If the new information is not comparable or competitive, the link
130. See supra note 29.
131. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,022, 51 Fed. Reg. 9738, 9738-39 (Mar.
20, 1986).
132. The cost of the satellite linkage will be shared equally. Id. at 9739. The "no fee"
provision is the subject of a challenge to the plan by Instinet Corp. See Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,989, 15,989-90 (Apr. 29, 1986).
133. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,989, 15,990 & n.5 (Apr.
29, 1986).
134. Id. at 15,990.
135. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
136. In general, increasing volume decreases a specialist's market-maintenance costs. See
supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 70. Specialists act like dealers in some trades, Stoll, supra note 65, at 8,
but a specialist also has a standing commitment to buy, which precludes "shopping" an order.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
140. Hamilton, supra note 58, at 491.
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will have no value. 141
It is difficult to conclude that there is any incentive, in economic theory,
for a quotation linkage such as the NASD-London arrangement that, at
least in part, duplicates available information.' 42 However, both London
and the NASD have indicated that they are using the information link as a
first step, and will explore clearing and trading arrangements as well.
1 43
This would follow the course outlined by many commentators: first to estab-
lish information-sharing links, and then to explore settlement and trading
links. 1" The NASD has clear incentives to pursue this course because the
"London connection" would be a valuable competitive advantage. 145 Thus,
even if the current information-trading arrangement creates no present bene-
fit, it can be viewed as a technological investment, designed to generate prof-
its in an evolving international marketplace.
C. Competition and Market Positioning
The above discussion of the "true" motives for the London-NASD agree-
141. If prices on the other quotation medium are uniformly lower, of course, there will be
no incentive to link. See supra text accompanying note 107.
142. The Commission noted that the United States individuals receiving the linked infor-
mation from London "already have access to this information to some extent through foreign
vendor systems." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,989, 15,990
(Apr. 29, 1986). The NASD expects some interest to be generated in the inter-quoted securi-
ties. In the NASD's most recent application to the Commission, it stated that:
The greater exposure of non-domestic equities information which this Pilot Program
provides will assist in broadening the depth and liquidity of the markets and further
the ability of issuers to raise capital for future expansion on a truly global basis.
More importantly, however, regulatory cooperation is being significantly advanced to
the benefit of the entire investing public.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,952, 52 Fed. Reg. 887, 888 (Jan. 9, 1987); see Cle-
ments, supra note 3, at 180 (quoting NASD President Gordon Macklin that the linkage "could
generate additional interest in those securities. Even at its primitive stage there's a customer
benefit.").
Similar arguments have been used to justify the newly-proposed NASDAQ-Singapore quo-
tation link. The link will be of limited usefulness; each exchange will provide only closing
quotes to the other. See Smith, supra note 39, at 40. Macklin notes that one purpose of the
linkage is to make NASDAQ companies "more visible in the overseas market." Id.
143. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,022, 51 Fed. Reg. 9738, 9738 (Mar. 20,
1986); Link or Lose, supra note 36, at 87.
144. See supra note 6; text accompanying note 124. London and the NASD have explicitly
represented that the currently authorized pilot program will not be used to operate an auto-
matic execution system. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,952, 52 Fed. Reg. 887, 888
(Jan. 9, 1987). Instinet Corporation's challenge to the arrangement is based in part on the fact
that the parties intend that it eventually support trading as well as quotations. Id.; Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,989, 15,990 (Apr. 29, 1986).
145. Clements, supra note 3, at 179 ("Establishing a link with the London Stock Exchange
is a key factor in the battle between the NYSE, Amex and the NASD."); see also supra notes
40-42 and accompanying text (interests of other competitors in London linkage).
19871
Catholic University Law Review
ment brings another factor into the economic analysis of the international
market for markets: marketing. Part of the motivation for linkage develop-
ment may be a technological investment necessary for future business.'
14 6
The economic theories of market development discussed above assumed that
changes in market structure would immediately reduce costs of execution or
improve its quality.'47 Most of the links do not conform to these theories;
large amounts of trading have not followed the new structure. This suggests
that different motivations may be responsible.
Supply of, and demand for, marketability services do not converge in a
homogeneous marketplace. "In the common American fashion, the ex-
changes form a national industry whose dynamic rivalries are key assets in
an increasingly global financial marketplace."'' 48 The various exchanges and
NASDAQ engage in continuous competition for listings and products. In-
ternationalization is simply one more area for that competition, 149 and pro-
motional activities or "marketing aggression" are an important part of the
effort.'"' Thus, the NYSE and NASD, both are seeking to establish connec-
tions with London, 5' the Amex,' 52 Midwest, 153 and Boston 54 each see va-
ried niche-building opportunities in their linkages.
The ability of exchanges to carve out niches of exclusive expertise is im-
portant for their profitable operation. Most observers believe that the inter-
national market will be a dealer market.' 55 Economic theory suggests that
exchanges are less efficient in this kind of market, with its infrequent, larger
trades,' 56 although exchange trading does have its advocates.' 57 Thus, it
146. Competition creates particular uncertainty about the extent of necessary investment.
See supra note 4.
147. See text accompanying supra note 103; see also supra notes 53-58 and accompanying
text.
148. The Future of the Exchanges, supra note 91, at 72. The same is true of the Canadian
exchanges. See Clements, supra note 3, at 180-83; Parallel Markets, supra note 97, at 88.
149. The Future of the Exchanges, supra note 91, at 76-77.
150. See Clements, supra note 3, at 179 (discussing major recent unsuccessful marketing
efforts by the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in two new index
products).
151. See id. at 179-80; Dodds, NASDAQ: On a Roll, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at 84,
88.
152. See Soneclar, Hanging on at the Amex, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at 82, 83.
153. See Stevens, The Regionals Shape Up, FIN. WORLD, Sept, 16, 1986, at 93, 98.
154. Id. at 96.
155. See, e.g., Internationalization Hearings, supra note 6, at 137 (statement of Jeffrey R.
Knight, Chief Executive, London Stock Exchange); Shopkorn, supra note 123, at 29; Hiltzik,
supra note 107, at 6 see also supra note 6.
156. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
157. Jeffrey R. Knight, Chief Executive of the London Stock Exchange, notes that pension
funds and other fiduciaries may move trading currently "upstairs" to an exchange "where the
determination of prices for securities is visible and reliable." Internationalization Hearings,
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would be profitable for an exchange to maintain a competitive edge even if it
is not currently profitable; "skilful marketing can save exchanges."' 58 A
linkage would be part of this effort; it would tend to lower future marketabil-
ity costs. Viewed from this perspective, investment in market linkages with
minimal current trading is rational economic activity.
III. THE ROLE OF REGULATION
The theory and evidence examined in Parts I and II indicate that markets
are linking to establish competitive positions for desired future expansion. If
they link to take advantage of currently-available cost reductions, greater
volume must be generated for the links to be viable."5 9 Furthermore, inter-
national trading, whether on or off board, is likely to be institutional and
block-sized. There will be little trading by individuals.'
6
0
The role of regulation in the development of the international securities
markets has not been a new or unfamiliar one. Exchange linkage is a modifi-
cation of traditional exchange operation. The relevant regulatory issues,
therefore, are the same: market surveillance and oversight. In each of the
four linkages that the Commission has approved-three for trading and one
for quotations-it has stressed the linked markets' abilities to surveil the
international trading' 6' and the Commission's ability to oversee linked ex-
change operations, especially those outside the United States. 162 In addition
to the actual trading link, clearance and settlement of linked trades is an area
supra note 6, at 138. He also notes that "[t]he prospect of stock markets being translated
substantially to international electronic networks carries with it the possibility of a reduction,
even a major reduction, in the quality of regulation able to be applied to the markets." Id. In
addition, commentators have speculated that the NYSE maintains an almost inherent preemi-
nence. The Future of the Exchanges, supra note 91, at 72; see also International Hearings,
supra note 6, at 51 (statement of Donald L. Calvin, Executive Vice President, New York Stock
Exchange, Inc.) (market's reliance on NYSE price as a benchmark); Ketchum, supra note 25,
at 35 (preference of United States traders for a marketplace centered around the NYSE); cf
McMurray, supra note 68, at 36 (perceived superior performance of specialists in thinly-traded
issues).
158. Clements, supra note 3, at 183 (emphasis in original) (citing the Montreal and Phila-
delphia Stock Exchanges as examples).
159. The one-way Boston-Montreal arrangement, however, could be viable with low vol-
ume. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
160. See Clements, supra note 3, at 176, 183.
161. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,449, 49 Fed. Reg. 44,575, 44,575 (Nov. 7,
1984) (Boston); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201, 39,204
(Sept. 27, 1985) (Amex); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854,
11,857 (Apr. 7, 1986) (Midwest); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg.
15,989, 15,990 (Apr. 29, 1986) (NASD).
162. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,449, 49 Fed. Reg. 44,575, 44,576 (Nov. 7,
1984) (Boston); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201, 39,204-06
(Sept. 27, 1985) (Amex); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854,
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of paramount concern.163 Many commentators have indicated that this is
the largest roadblock to development of a smooth international market.
1 '6
The details of exchange operation are mechanical regulatory concerns, but
they are an important first step. 165 If there is to be any expansion or modifi-
cation of trading or operations on linked exchange markets, there must be a
base of effective surveillance and oversight. Such regulation is also necessary
to promote actual fairness as well as the perception of fairness. For although
11,857-58 (Apr. 7, 1986) (Midwest); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg.
15,989, 15,990 (Apr. 29, 1986) (NASD).
163. In generally discussing internationalization, the Commission noted that "as the trend
toward international trading increases, it will become increasingly important for foreign trad-
ing markets to establish efficient, safe, and accurate comparison, clearance, and settlement
systems especially if they seek to link with United States securities markets and their respective
clearing agencies." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302, 16,307
(Apr. 25, 1985).
164. See Internationalization Hearings, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Gordon S. Mack-
lin, President, National Association of Securities Dealers Inc.); id. at 65-66 (statement of Don-
ald L. Calvin, Executive Vice President, New York Stock Exchange); id. at 138 (statement of
Jeffrey R. Knight, Chief Executive, London Stock Exchange); Hunter, The Status and Evolu-
tion of Twenty-four Hour Trading: A Trader's View of International Transactions, Clearance,
and Settlement, 4 B.U. Int'l L.J. 15, 21 (1986); Ketchum, supra note 25, at 37; Shopkorn,
supra note 123, at 29.
There have been market responses in linkage of clearing systems as well as the trading sys-
tems discussed in this Article. The settlement mechanisms in the Boston, Amex and Midwest
linkages are similar: the Canadian Depository for Securities has affiliated with the respective
United States clearing agency in each case. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,449, 49
Fed. Reg. 44,575, 44,575 n.5 (Nov. 7, 1985) (Boston); Securities Exchange Act Release No.
22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201, 39,202 (Sept. 27, 1985) (Amex); Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854, 11,856 (Apr. 7, 1986) (Midwest). For a discussion of clear-
ing arrangements in commodities links see supra text accompanying note II (CME-SIMEX);
text accompanying note 45 (Comex-Sydney).
165. In addition to the mechanics of linked trading, wider issues of international trading
are raised by linked trading and its counterpart, worldwide "upstairs" dealing and brokerage.
The Commission raised many of these problems in a concept release and request for comment
in mid-1985. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302 (Apr. 25,
1985).
Many of the substantive concerns of broker-dealers relate to distributions of securities in the
United States and United States laws preventing fraud and manipulation. See The Future of
the Exchanges, supra note 91, at 75 (prevention of insider trading).
Two rules which pose problems internationally are Securities Exchange Act Rules lOb-6 and
lOb-7, which limit a broker-dealer's ability to participate in and stabilize the price of securities
it underwrites or distributes. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-6, .10b-7 (1986); see Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 21,958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302, 16,308-09 (Apr. 25, 1985); Ketchum,
supra note 25, at 35; Newburg, United States Companies and International Financings, 20
INT'L LAW. 765, 774 (1986).
Another area of concern is the extent to which such activities will be permitted by foreign
broker-dealers in the United States without registration. See generally Securities Act Release
No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (July 22, 1964) (permitted extent of participation). The Commis-
sion also has noted barriers to United States broker-dealers' entry into certain foreign markets.
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302, 16,308 (Apr. 25, 1985).
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the international market is, and will probably remain, the province of dealers
and institutional investors, 166 observers recognize that the individual must
have a place and must be assured that the market is open to him as well.
167
This is important to larger traders as well; uncertainty and unfamiliarity is
the primary reason that trading takes place on the telephone. Trading up-
stairs provides an opportunity to become familiar with another trader's busi-
ness, reliability, customs, and other attributes.
1 68
For all these reasons, some amount of regulation will continue in linked
markets, independent of the larger questions of international brokerage regu-
lation generally. 169 Linked markets must function smoothly and fairly, or
they provide no advantage. This requires at least effective surveillance and
oversight. Such regulation does impose an additional cost, 170 but it is neces-
sary for the effective protection of the markets. 171 Fair development of in-
ternational trading, whether in response to eventual demand or simply
competitive market positioning, demands no less.
IV. CONCLUSION
Several linkages of securities markets, commodities markets, and quota-
tion systems have been adopted in the past three years and many more have
been proposed. The economic theory of securities market operation suggests
that linkages could reduce costs if they increase the volume of trading han-
dled by exchange specialists. This would lower the specialist's cost of opera-
tions and narrow spreads, which could in turn increase volume further.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 155 & 160.
167. Taub, The Big Board: New Vigor, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at 78, 79.
168. See Internationalization Hearings, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of Gordon S. Mack-
lin, President, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.) ("[Flirms may very well prefer,
in the early stages [of international trading], to use the telephone contact as a means of build-
ing close professional relationships from country to country."); Shopkorn, supra note 123, at
29 (If a system of "anonymous counterparties" develops, user quality may become low, which
"plays into the hands of those who insist that the human element of trading will never be
replaced.").
169. See Clements, supra note 3, at 183 (discussing government "demand" for regulation).
170. See id.; Amihud, Ho & Schwartz, Overview of the Changing Securities Markets in
MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 9 (Y.
Amihud, T. Ho & R. Schwartz eds. 1985) ("To achieve the best possible trading system for
financial markets, we need discretionary planning. To get such planning, we must look to the
regulators.").
171. See The Future of the Exchanges, supra note 91, at 75 (quoting Securities and Ex-
change Commission Chairman John Shad: "They [foreign exchanges] should be willing to
[adopt United-States-style regulation] for the good of their own markets."); Karmel, supra
note 92, at 105 (although international securities traders are not interested in regulation, they
will adopt it as necessary to inspire the investor confidence required for proper market
development).
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Such potential exists in the Amex-Toronto and Midwest-Toronto links, and
to a lesser extent in the Boston-Montreal link, because it currently involves
only one-way trading. The economic theory of commodities market opera-
tions suggests that linkages could reduce time-to-market risk, and thus lower
trading costs. Such potential exists in the CME-SIMEX and Comex-Sydney
links as well as in the longer trading hours implemented by the Chicago
Board of Trade and planned by other markets.
Even if linkages do not result in immediately lower trading costs for cus-
tomers, specialists or market makers, incentives to link still exist. Exchanges
compete for listings and for trades, and this is another basis of competition.
International trading is an uncertain and unfamiliar area. If an exchange
can reduce uncertainty or unfamiliarity by linking with another exchange, it
has a competitive advantage over other exchanges and the "upstairs" mar-
ket. This suggests why linkage efforts would persist absent large trading
volume.
These developments do not produce novel regulatory problems, but re-
quire regulators to apply familiar policies in a new area. As with domestic
markets, regulators must assure adequate surveillance and oversight. The
Commission has taken specific steps in each approved link to assure ade-
quate access to information to monitor both the trading and the exchanges'
self-regulation. Regardless of how or why linked markets exist, this regula-
tion will permit fair development of the new international marketplace.
[Vol. 36:833
